Survey studies of attitudes toward pricing in retai! markets (Kahneman et al., 19H6, hereafter KKT: 1987) have reported that respondents do not consider it fair for a firm to increase prices and profits when there is a short-run change in the economic environment that is not justified by a cost increase. For example, the following hypothetícal circumstances are posed (KKT, p. 201): "Ouestion 1. A hardware store has been selling snow shovels for $15. The morning after él Iarge snowstorm the store raises the price to $20. PIcase rate this action as: Completely Fair ---Acceptable ---Unfair ---Very Unfair ---." Eighty-two percent of respone!ents rate this action as unfair or very unfair. What is fairness'? This question is not addressed by KKT. In the light of our data, and relatee! !iterature, we return to the issue of ínter-preting fairness in Section V.
that they would follow fair policies in the absence of enforcement through punishment. Thus people report that they would leave restaurant tips (about 15%) even in cities they did not expect to visit again." Respondents also report that they expect automobile repairmen to treat tourists and regular eustomers alike in spite of the differing possibilities for long-term punishment strategies .
These considerations lead to the proposition that markets in which a flrm makes pricing decisions that affect customers (e.g .. posted prices in retail markets) will fail to clear if excess demand is not justifled by increases in supplier costs (KKT p. 213) . This is because of the principie of dual entitlements. under which customers have a right to the terms of a reference transaction. while the firm has a right to its reference proflt (Zajac, . Recent posted prices can serve to define the reference transaction (KKT, . But people do adapt: "Psychological studies of adaption suggest that any stable state of affairs tends to become accepted eventually. at least in the sense that alternatives to it no longer come to mind. Terms of exchange that are initially seen as unfair may in time acquire the status of a reference transaction ... they adapt their views of fairness to the norms of actual behavior" (KKT, p. 203) . These considerations imply that the short-run price response to excess demand will be sluggish in markets in which a price increase is not justified by an increase in unit supply cost; if the excess demand persists, only new higher prices are sustainable, and people will adapt by redefining the reference transaction. Thc equilibrium may still be that which is predicted from economic theory. In this chapter we assume that Wildcat Cluh. Why is the $100 eonlrihution not included in the ofticial price of the ticket') Verv simply. it gives the athletic department more hudget flexihility under state spending rules. The alhletic departmenl does nol price all tickets to clcar the market to avoid a fcared firestorm 01' protesl from the Iegislature. lhe alumni and the communily who bought lheir liekels years earlier in loyal support of a less popular haskelhall programo Many of these individuals may feel thal they ha ve earned their implicit entillcment eontraet. and many eontribute additional money lo university programs. Allhough lipping in such silualions has been described by KKT as duc lo a fairness elhic, il is imporlanl lo realize thal il is bascd on a widely accepkd expeClalion that tipping is an exchange -a pavmenl for sen·ice. The IRS considers tips an exchange and taxes the cmployer"s estimate as income. The powerful expectations that drive tipping are clear in the following ineident involving one 01' us (Smilh): Ten people go lo a Mexican restauranl al lhe end of a con[erence day. No one Ieaves a tip in lhe belief that with groups 01' six or more an automalie 15'10 gratuity is included. The waiter follows the payer inlo the parking 101 and demands to know whal was wrong with lhe scrviee'l It was fine. Bul you left no tipo Wasn'l a lip included in the bilP No. Forlhwith he is givcn $20. Upon reporting, lhis experience in various seminar presentations. other such incidents oI oUlraged waiters (blocking the exil dnor) and taxi drivers (hurling eoins at a tlecing cuslorner) are brought forward. Clearly, there is a slrong mutual expectalinn lhal service rcquires a reward. which is recognized and taxed hy the statc. This is so whether nr nol an exchange will be repcaled.
the hypothesized short-run failure o[ markets to clear depends upon buyers knowing that increased profits would result from the higher prices. In the absence of such information, buyers do not have a common reason for resisting the actions.
B. Questíon 1 Responses: M{[rket Effects
In order to better understand the responses to KKTs Question 1, we conducted two variations on it. First, we noticcd two features of their ljuestion that scemed un usual. We get 32.4% who rate the action as Unacceptable or Completely Unacceptable. We use these results as a subject control for introducing a treatment change. Using a different sample ol' respondents from the same pool 01' undergraduates. our second variation of Question 1 posed the same situation, but added the sentence: "'The store does this to prevent a stockout for its regular customers since another store has raised its price to $20." Changes in the economic environment have implied consequences in the behavior 01' markets: our purpose was to express the sort of market consequence that might reasonably follow such a change.
1
The issue here is whether the store's response to market competition could serve to justify its action (in addition to KKTs postulate that people will accept a price increase, relative to a reference transaction. if it arises [rom an excess demand that is cost-justified , Wh~n markets rail to clcar at below-eljuilibriul11 priccs, bllth buyers ami sellers are hurt by the resulting stock-out approach to rationing. Sorne buvers, who would be submarginal at the equilibrium, can profltably buy at the disequilibrium price: this displaces intramarginal buvers for whol11 purchasc is more protítable, wíth conscqucnt losses 01' buver profit (surplus). In particular. if we postulatc KKTs local stores, one unfair consequence 01' not raising price is that some units are sold to crossover buyers who thereby displace sales to neighborhood custorncrs. Ir the store rduses to sell to strangers (besides bcing actionable in court), it is vulnerable to the chargc that this is unfair to all who drive out of their \Vay to buv at the lowcst cosl. Given a change from the rdcrence baseline, all altcrnative policies 'are unfair to some subsct 01' buye~·s.
With a market justification the percentage in the last two categories falls from 32.4 to 19.5%. These data suggest the need for reward-motivated experiments. in a posted-offer market setting. to further explore the KKT hypothesis that subjects might trade off self-interested behavior against concerns of fairness.
C.

Prcviolls Experill1ents
Kachelmeier et al. (1991 a: hereafter KLS) report laboratory experiments designed to measure the eHect of the foregoing fairness considerations on actual price responses and convergence behavior in experimental markets using huyer posted bid pricing. In their environment. five buyers and five sellers trade for ten periods under stationary value/cost conditions. Buyers independently post bid prices. and sellers respond with individual sales by accepting bids. Then a change is introduced for a new ten-period sequence. In the first sequen ce. sellers are subject to a 50°;;, profit tax such that. at the competitive equilibrium price and volume. the sellers' share of total surplus is exactly 50%. But in the second sequence 01' ten trading periods. thc sellers' 50% profit tax is replaced by a 20% sales tax on each selter's revenue. The effect 01' this sales tax is to raise the previous marginal cost supply schedule. MC(q). to 1.25 MC(q). This increases the competitive equilibrium price. lowers the volume. and increases the sellers' share of total profit. Each of three different information treatment conditions is replicated three times with different subjects (90 subjects total): (1) seller marginal cost information is disc10sed to all subjects: (2) the sellers' share 01' aggregate profit (surplus) is disclosed to alt subjects: (3) no marginal cost or profit information is disc1osed. With prolit disc1osure. buyers are fully informed that. compared with the previous ten reference transactions periods. the change to a sales tax re gime has shifted net surplus from buyers to sellers. With marginal cost disc1osure. buyers are informed that prices must increase to cover the new seller costs. Consequently. profit disc10sure focuses on the KKT principie that sellers are only entitled to their previous reference profit (it is unfair ror sellers to profit 1'rom the tax). whereas marginal cost disclosure reinforces the principie that any price increase is justified by a unit cost increase. The treatment with no marginal cost or profit disc1o-sure provides experimental control. The prediction hypotheses. based on KKT. are as follows (KLS. p. 6(7).
H 1: The initial price response to a change from an income to a sales tax will be greater under marginal cost disc10sure than under profit disc1osure.
Convergence over time relative to the baseline control experiments will he H2: [aster under marginal cost disclosure: H3: slower under protlt disclosure.
KLS report statistical support for all three hypotheses.~ Our results for posted-offer pricing are complctely consistent with those 01' KLS, except for some minor dcviations in the eftlcicncy rcsults, which we discuss in Section JII.
Ex[cl/sion: Pos[cd Bid VerslIs Pos[cd otlcr
The institution used by KLS is posted-hid pricing. '"Thc trading rule allowcd only buycrs to propose prices" (KLS, p. 700). This was defended on the grounds 01' '"intcntional experimental artificiality." That is, sin ce fairness dircctly concerns the perceptions and response 01' huyers, this device enables direct t11easurement 01' that response in terms of posted buying priccs. On this note, we propose to examine the robustness of the KLS results using the familiar retail inslitution in which sellers post prices lo buyers. This institulion is quite clearly Ihe one Ihat KKT have in mind in their consumer markel examples (although they do discuss lahor markets in which wage bicis are made by lirms). To wit: '"For example, 68 percent 01' respondents said they would switch their patronage to a drugstore nve minutes further away if the one closer to thel11 raised its prices when él competitor was temporarily forced to close .... Retailcrs will have a substantial incentive to behave fairly ir a large number of customers are preparecl ... lo avoicl doing business with an unfair nrm" (KKT, p. 212). Thus, cuslomers will withhold demand fmm an unfair nrm. and, anticipating this, the nrm will have an incentive to price 1'airly. In the following experiments in which sellers inclependently post prices to the buyers, we can study not only huyer clemand withholding behavior but also the sellers' indirect attitudcs toward 1'airness as expressed in the prices they post to buyers. 01' course, i1' sellers post lower prices under profit disclosure, we cannol know whether it is beca use they are being fair or he cause they are simply responding rationally to avoid expectcd punishment by buyers.
We employ the Novanet (Plato) posted-offer mechanism descrihed by Ketcham et al. (1984) , with the Illodification thar. in the following I In a n:lakd studv. Kachélmeier d al.
(1')()lh) cxamine Jairness using thc oral doubkauction trading rules witil a different experimental dC'oign ami pcrspccti\'e. The hasic result. hO\\ é\'cr. a tcndcnc\' Jor the Jaime'os dfcct to dissipatc ()\ er timé. is the salllc. In this chaplLr. \\é u'oe the dcsign reportcd in Kl.S (1'll)la). experiments, sellers could nor see each other's prices after independently posting them in each periodo This has the effect of reducing the ability of sellers to undercut each other's prices (i.e .. by this procedure one cxpects to observe a purer and perhaps more persistent individual fairness response, thereby giving the KKT theory its best shot in the experimental market context)o This is not to deny that markcts may be more competitive when sellers observe each other's prices. Rather, our point is that the reported experiments control for this, and, if the effect of fairness disappears, then under this interpretation we have a stronger result. The effect of publicizing price information can always be studied using the experiments herein as a comparison control.
Experimental Design
Essentially. we used the same experimental design as in KLS. The information disclosure treatments are identical to those described in Section I. Our supply and demand environment, also identical with that of KLS, is shown in Figure 4 .1 for both the profit tax regime in part one of the experiment, and the sales tax regime in part two. Our design and procedures differed from KLS only in the following respects.
1. We used six buyers and six sellers, rather than five each. (This was to accommodate a second independent follow-on experiment that required 12 subjects.) 2. Each of the three treatment conditions. parts one and two, were replicated four times instead of three times (144 subjects total). 3. Two control experiments were run for 12 price/purchase periods in part one; the others were run for 10 periods. Two profit disclosure experiments were run for 20 periods in part two; the others were run for 10 periods. The two 10nger profit disclosure experiments allowed us to determine if any equilibrating tendencies continued after the first 10 periods. 4. Between parts one and two of their experiments. KLS scheduled a break allowing buyers and sellers to be separated (ostensibly to pay them privately) and given the required separate instructions for the part two. sales tax (no disclosure), regime. We did not do this but rather elected to simply pass out different instruction forms to buyers and to sellers in the control experiment: since everyone received papee this disguised the different treatment of sellers. The instructions to buyers simply informed them that their redemption values in part two were the same as in part one. whereas sellers were told that starting in the next period they would paya sales tax rather than a profits tax. 
Hypotheses and Experimental Results
HI. In period 1, part two, the first period of trading under the sales tax regime. the KKT fairness argument will yield prices ordered as follows:
• AII fmllls ami supplelllcntal inslruclional hanl!ouls are availahlc hy writing lo lhe élulhors (Smith). The wcighted mean contract pricc (each posted pricc is weighted by volume) for the four experimcnts in each information condition is shown plotted across all periods in both parts of the experiments in Figure 4 .2. 1 n part t wo. there is initially (period one) a clear separation oC mean obscrved prices in accordance with H l. Under marginal cos1. disclosure prices jump immediately to the new equilibrium. whereas under profit disclosure they do not changc from their previous "refercnce transaction"level. By period 10. the mean price under all three information conditions has converged to near the new competitive equilibrium price ($2.90). Finally. the two experiments that were extended for 20 periods in part two stabilize at slightly above the competitive equilibrium price in periods 11-20.
CE
Prices in Posted-Offer Markets
We test H l and H2 using the nonparametric Jonckeere test that the samples (mean contract prices). of size mJ= 4). are from an a priori orc\ering of n(= J) c\istributions against the null alternative that the samples come from the same c\istribution. The Jonckeere test is a generalization of the one-tailec\ Wilcoxon test. For H l. we reject the null hypothesis with a test statistic .I 1 (J. 4) = 2.J4 (p = .01). For H2. we are unable to reject thc null hypothesis . .leO. 4) = -0.4J9 (p = .
. 3]).
In the profit tax regime (part one. periods 1-12. Figure 4 .2). although prices in all trcatmcnt conditions hover above the competitive equilibrium. prices are lowest under protit c\isclosure. The three series come together. however. by perioc\ ten. Consequently. even in the baseline series. with no reference transaction. initially we observe lower prices under protit disclosure. Profit disclosure blunts the profit-seeking behavior 01' sellers relative to the other experiments. But the effect of profit disclosure is even more striking under the sales tax regime. given the previous reference transactions in the baseline. The tendency of the "protit disclosure" price path to be below that 01' the "marginal cost'o and "no disclosure" treatments is evident. but the control and marginal cost disclosure price paths are inc\istinguishable after the f¡rst three periods in part two.
In Table 4 .2. we report the frequcncy with which demanc\ is withheld (underrevealed) by buyers. This frequency is determined by counting the number of instances in which each buyer fails to buy at a price equal to or below his/her redemption value. Although the incidence of withholding. in the profit disc\osure treatment, is far greater in the sales tax regime (23) than in the profit tax regime (4). we saw 22 cases in one experiment! Furthermore. that experiment yielded mean prices below that of two other experiments. This observed withholding was an uncontrolled "treatment" variable. It is important to note that the mean posted prices in that experiment were not higher than in the other experiments with sales tax. On the contrary. in all periods they were lower than in two other experiments. and in the first period after the tax change they were the lowest of al!. For the detailed price path. see Figure 4 .3: the experiment in which the withholding occurred is SA4P. lt would appear that the tendency of sellers to post lower prices earlier but not later in the sequence of trading periods was the result of either seller fairness behavior or anticipation of strategic buyer withholding, not a response to buyer withholding. Withholding did not significantly affect efficiencies, mainly beca use often (though not always) only marginal units were withheld. However, there is one efficiency difference between our experiments and KLS. One of their hypotheses was that "Profit information will lead to lower volume and lower market cfficiency than in either the cost-disclosure or no-disclosure markets" (KLS. p. 6(8), and they reported support for this hypothesis. Our data did not support this hypothesis. In only two periods (6 and 10) was the average efficiency and the trading volume in the profit disclosure experiments the lowest of all treatments. Similarly, we observed lower efficiency and trading volume in the marginal cost disclosure treatment than did KLS. Minor differences are to be expected because the microstructure of the institutions (rules) of trade are different. But overall the results reported by KLS are robust with respect to the change to posted-offer pricing.
IV. Discussion
Economists and econometricians have long allowed that nonmonetary and noneconomic factors inftuence behavior, although the standard rational model has always be en more prominent. The exceptions are implicit in concepts of external economies in consumption. Recent work (e.g., KKT) has shown how survey evidence can be used to study systematically, and categorize, a wide variety of behaviors that may deviate from the narrow interpretation of rational self-interested models of equilihrium hehavior.
In this chapter, we studied the effect of alternative information disclosures on the prices posted by sellers subsequent to an exogenous increase in seller marginal costs (a sales tax). If, as argued by KKT buyers are more receptive to price increases that appear to be cost justified than to price increases that increase profits aboye reference transaction levels. then, recognizing this, sellers will post lower prices under profit disclosure than under marginal cost disclosure. Over time, however, this discrepancy need not persist because, as KKT argue, actual (equilibrium) behavior may allow the estahlishment of a new reference transaction that does not violate social norms of fair behavior. Our results support this argument. Consequently, the prediction that equilibrium outcomes will reflect the rational behavior of standard economic models is supported, although the transition path to the new equilibrium is affected by such fairness considerations. This result is particularly strengthened by the fact that sellers could not see each other's prices. Hence, convergence was not helped by a seller seeing that others were raising prices. Our results also support the value of survey data in uncovering potential anomalies, which can then be tested in the context of motivated decisions to see if the flndings survive in actual behavioL According to the NelV York Times (Lohr. 1992), Hurricane Andrew, striking South Florida on August 24, 1992, provided a fine example of how the KKT fairness considerations are needed to modify economic theory. "What happened in the plywood market here after the storm is a classic example of fairness constraints at work .... The big companies (Home Depot. Georgia Pacific and Louisiana-Pacific) performed far differently (increasing the price only about half as much as the 'marker) than the price-gougers selling ice, water and lumber 1'rom the back 01' pickup trucks at wildly inflated prices in the (¡rst week after the hurricane hit. Classic economic theory, of course, defends these ... " (Lohr, 1992, p. e2) . Actually what classical theory does is to explain, 110t defend. the competitive market operated out of the back 01' pickup trucks. In a competitive market. those who would attempt to charge low prices would stock out more quickly, and thus are under pressure to mise prices. given the limited supplies: otherwise. arbitrage profits will be collected by third parties. Modern economics, in the form of reputation theory, also explains tlle actions of the large tirms who have much greater control over their market. Their national sources of supply enable them, through transfers. to replenish stocks more quickly. price less aggressively, and build a long-term reputation for not "price gouging" (with free advertising, courtesy of the Ncw York Times article) but simultaneously reap supra normal profits (they did raise prices, if only half as much as the competitive fringe). But one does not need a utilitarian 1'airness ethic to explain the repeated game (versus one-shot) nature 01' the long-run outlook of large suppliers. Similarly, optimization theory predicts that if buyers believe that they can conserve their resources by complaining about price gouging being unfair, then they will do it. The long-term result (hidden from the average consumer) may aClually build the market power of the large firms, reduce competition. and decrease welfare: all in the good name 01' fairness. Would a rose by another name smell so sweet?
V. What Is Fairness'!
We think that the answer to the question What is fairness? is likely to depend on the particular context in which fairness is used. In the context that we study here, the results are not consistent with the idea that fair-ness considerations belong in the utility function, as an externality in consumption that alters in a sustainable way the equilibrium behavior predicted by the standards own utility maximizing model.
h
We suggest that fairness in our context is best characterized as affecting agcnt expectations, not their utility funetions. Thus, buyers expecting (fccling that they have a right to) fair treatment believe that price increases resulting from external cost increases should not produce higher profits for sellers. Sellers, aeeepting this norm of fair treatmcnt, or fearing rctaliation, do not attcmpt initially to '"extraet" higher profit. These expeetations yield no change in priees, initially, but sueh priees are unsustainable as an equilibrium (i.c .. there is excess demand). In the absenee of a utility being [air, sellers gradually do what eomes naturally: They raise prices anc\ finc\ rewards in higher profits. If sellers receivec\ utilitarian value from fairness, they would be satisfiec\ with lower profit by accepting the profit-fairness trac\e-off. If buyers received utilitarian value from fairness, their final equilibrium demanc\ levels would not be prec\ietec\ from the moc\cl that maximizes thcir monetary reward. By this interpretation, the expectations of both buyers anc\ sellers as to what is acceptable or fair changes ovcr time. This also explains why fairness dominates the questionnairc responses of subjects. Their answers are basec\ upon their expectations, not on the unanticipated and unanticipatable adjustments that can occur in the c\ynamics of actual market or experimental market behavior. This is beeause no one (except the expcrimenter in a market experiment) can anticipate the new equilibrium anc\ its possible effeet on transient expectations of what is fair. /¡¡¡, with (1[, /1[, , ) = I'l'í'/P,~, Clearly, if a> 0, the externality cquilihrium.xl = ."" is distinct froll1 that which \\'ould prevaiL wherc x'j' = V';'. hased on lhe absence (Jf the externalitv ((X = O). The pricc and quantity levels to which our experimental data cOIl\'Crge 0\ er time correspond to the situation in this exall1ple in which (a = O) (i.e .. the reslllts in pan two uf the experiment are prcdicted froll1 the standard O" n-lllaxill1izing I1lodcl 01' lItilitv).
Our expectati,;ns interpretation nf fairness is consistent with the reslllts of Hnllll1an et al. (1994) in their ultill1atul11 and dictator ¡lame cxperimcnts, although here the results are stronger hecausc there are six (not onc) bargainers on each side 01' the market. Also AIso, questionnaire data summarize average, not marginal, opinion, and we know from hundreds of controlled laboratory experiments that competitive outcomes and efficiency are driven by marginal analysis (sometimes called the marginal trader hypothesis). Thus, in markets like the one in Figure 4 .1, average MV and average Me are irrelevant to determining the equilibrium, where MV(Qc') 2: MC(Qe)' The marginal trader hypothesis explains why the Iowa Presidential stock market is a much more accurate predictor of the popular vote than opinion polls, although the participants pro ve to have, on average, all the standard opinion biases established by politica! science and sociologica! studies (Forsythe et al., 1992) . Fehr et al. (1993) provided a different context in which the word fairness is associated with deviations from self-interested behavior. First movers (buyers) compete by announcing buying priees (anonymously by telephone through an experimenter) to sellers who can accept but not make caunter affers. Sellers then chaose a "qua lit y" ar effart level far the good they produce; given any accepted price, it is in the sellers' interest to choose low effort but in the buyer-seller joint interest to choose high. Buyers do best individually with a low price, if sellers choose high effort, but the dominant strategy of sellers is to choose low. Cooperative play requires buyers to buy at a high price and to trust sellers to reciprocate with a high effort. In this two-stage market game, the gains from exchange are maximized by cooperative (rair) behavior not by competitive action in the self interest. The market study reported here is the opposite: the gains from exchange are maximized by competition, and reduced by fair behavior (unless their is utilitarian compensation from fairness ).
The Fehr et al. (1993) experimental data across pairs and periods shows a statistically and economically significant positive relationship between price and quality. The results are especially interesting since the pairings by the market are not constant through time so that reciprocity is diffuse.
It is not clea!', however, in what sense these results are explained by see Binmore et al.
(1')')2) who reported Nash hargaining experimenls in which the median suhject optimizes in the long run in accordance with tbe tbeory using trial-and-crror adjustment processes. "!-Iowever. the suhjects scem lo sce no contradiction hetween such optimizing and 'fair' behavior. since lhe median suhject reports as fair pretty much what actua1l" happens towards the end of the games he or she played. These results are consistent witb a vilOw that regards bchavior as heing shaped by social norms in the minc1s nI' the \Ubjeets. but whieh sces the social norms lhemsclves being dctcrmincd by evolulionary considerations of which lhe subjeets are (mI" dimly aware" (Binmorc et al.. 1<)')2.
p. 34). 'Illis is consistent with KKT. with the adaptive rcsults in the psychology literature. and with lbe results reported in this chaplcr.
a (utilitarian?) fairness ethic as opposed to a mutual expectationlrecognition by all parties that individual rewards will deteriorate across time if there is not reciprocity (e.g .. better qua lit y for better prices). Parallel results have been reported by Berg et al. (1995) in the single play of a two-stage dictator game run under double blind conditions (see Hoffman et al.. 1994 : subjects pairings are anonymous with respect to each other and the experimenter who cannot know who made what decision). In Stage l. subjects in room A choose how much of their $10 endowment to send to an anonymous counterpart in room B. Each dollar sent will be tripled (common knowledge) before it reaches the counterpart. who. in Stagc II. chooses how much of this tripled amount to pay back to the person in room B. The dominant strategy for subjects in room A is to keep all the money beca use it is a dominant strategy for any money received in room A to be retained. The average amount sent is $5.16 with an average payback of $4.66. In a second "social norm"" treatment. all subjects are given a common history: the outcomes from all plays in the first treatment. The average sent is now $5.36 with a payback of $6.46. Berg et al. (1995) do not suggest that their results are due to fairness. As they describe it. they are studying trust and reciprocity. Subjects in room A can substantially leverage thcir endowments by "investment"· in amounts sent to room B. But this requires trust and an expectation of reciprocity. They are studying mcchanisms of social exchange and how the social norms that support such exchange can emerge from historical experience. These mechanisms allow gains from exchange to be captured in situations where traclitional economic analysis woulcl suggest market failure. Such mechanisms are metarational. and materially extend the rational choice paradigm to include the evolution of institutions that promote gains from cxchange in situations that are not incentive compatible.
We think the results of our chapter and those of Fehr et al. (1993) and of Berg et al. (1995) contribute to a unificd understanding of anomalous behavior usually attributed to fairness. The contexts differ in the three studies. but the anomalous resuIts are not explained satisfactorily by a utilitarian fairness ethic. by expectations that are not sustainable (in our study). or by trust coupled with expectations of reciprocity (in the other two studics). The common outcomc across the three studies is for subjects to approach the efficient maximization of the social monetary gains from exchange.
